As friction increases between China and Vietnam over the South China Sea, an important question is how Vietnam’s military, famed decades ago for its resilience and guerrilla warfare, measures up. For the last two months, Chinese and Vietnamese Coast Guard vessels have been jostling each other around a billion-dollar Chinese oil rig that Vietnam says was unilaterally placed in its waters by Beijing. (Beijing says the waters are Chinese.) Warships from both countries lurk in the distance, and from time to time, the Chinese send air force fighters into the rig’s vicinity to show they mean business.
Prof. Lyle J. Goldstein, associate professor at the China Maritime Studies Institute at the Naval War College in Rhode Island, is well qualified to examine the capacities of the Chinese and Vietnamese militaries. The two armies worked together in Vietnam to topple the French in the 1950s, and to defeat the Americans in the Vietnam War. In 1979, the Chinese invaded Vietnam — to teach its neighbor a lesson for invading Cambodia, said Deng Xiaoping — and the Chinese retreated with stunning casualties in less than a month. That humbling experience was an impetus for the Chinese to begin the modernization of their armed forces.
Professor Goldstein, who is fluent in Chinese and Russian, has an M.A. in strategic studies from Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. During his PhD studies at Princeton he specialized in Chinese and spent time at Beijing City College. He joined the Naval War College in 2001 and helped establish the China Maritime Studies Institute in 2006, serving as its first director until 2011. The institute was founded specifically to conduct research for the United States Navy on China’s rapidly expanding navy. In 2012, Professor Goldstein, an avid reader of China’s military periodicals, worked on a project called “Research on Chinese Military Assessments of Selected East Asian Regional Powers.” He found that the Chinese had a certain disdain for the Vietnamese Navy but considerable respect for its air force.
Q.
Vietnam seems to want to strike a path that maintains a degree of independence from China, and from the United States. How does that play out in the military sphere?
A.
Vietnam is a country with a strong military tradition. Undoubtedly, Hanoi’s contemporary diplomacy and military strategy are strongly influenced by Vietnam’s modern history as a “giant killer.” The Vietnamese succeeded in ejecting the French colonizers during the 1950s, then defeating the Americans (1965-73) and finally in standing up to China in a short but bloody border war (1979). This history seems to have imbued Vietnam with a confidence to develop a rather independent approach to foreign policy. It likely has also encouraged Vietnam to invest heavily in defense — turning chiefly to its traditional partner Russia in that endeavor. Unlike certain other countries in Southeast Asia (e.g., the Philippines), Vietnam is not inclined to neglect defense. On the other hand, Vietnam’s most promising strategy versus China is the hope that it might have sufficient forces for deterrence, while simultaneously pursuing diplomacy to resolve disputes.
Q.
You have done some research on how the Chinese view Vietnam and its military. Do the Chinese have respect for the Vietnamese military? Do they harbor bad memories of the 1979 war against Vietnam? What does China, now so much more powerful, think now of Vietnam’s defense capacity?
A.
The Chinese have monitored Vietnam’s growing defense capacity extremely closely. Interestingly, both Beijing and Hanoi have relied to some extent on Russian arms — submarines, destroyers and frigates, as well as aircraft — to accelerate their defense modernization efforts. This common experience more than likely informs China’s overall assessment of Vietnam’s military abilities. There is some irony in the fact that the very same weapons and tactics that China might hypothetically deploy against Japan or the U.S. in any possible armed conflict could also be deployed by Vietnam against China.
On the other hand, China also understands that importing weaponry from Russia is not necessarily an ideal situation, because it may inevitably lead to serious and even endemic training and maintenance lapses. The recent major submarine accident in India, involving a Kilo-class diesel submarine imported from Russia, well illustrates the risks involved. At this point, Vietnam is much more dependent on weapons and military expertise from Russia than is China, which can rely on much more indigenous military capacity.
While the 1979 war is not a major topic of open discussion and research in China, there does seem to be ample respect in China for Vietnam’s overall fighting prowess. Nevertheless, Chinese military researchers have pointed out various weaknesses in Vietnam’s evolving military strategy. Specifically, it has been noted that submarines may be a major thrust of Vietnam’s efforts, but Chinese analysts assess that Vietnam is fundamentally lacking in major experience in operating these incredibly complex weapons systems. Another possible weakness in Vietnam’s defense capability identified by Chinese analysts concerns surveillance, targeting and battle management. There seems to be a general sense that China could prevail in any armed clash, following what is referred to in Chinese military circles as the “3.14 model,” which refers to the 14 March 1988 clash in the Spratlys in which a small Chinese naval flotilla sank a couple of Vietnamese ships in a small but decisive engagement.
Q.
Vietnam has bought six Kilo-class submarines from the Russians. Why did they choose those subs? Will the Vietnamese have crew well enough trained to run the subs? Are the subs well suited to Vietnam’s needs?
A.
Many naval analysts contend that the submarine is the capital ship of any modern navy. While surface ships have become increasingly vulnerable to long-range detection and precision strike, submarines remain quite survivable because of the inherent difficulties of hunting submarines. They can operate quite independently, but still deliver lethal blows with either torpedoes or antiship cruise missiles (ASCM).
The Kilo-class Russian diesel submarine has been a popular export around the world, including to the navies of both India and China. The submarine is respected as a formidable opponent in U.S. Navy circles, not only because it is rated to have a low acoustic signature, making detection extremely difficult, but also because of the effectiveness of its associated weapons systems, for example the Klub-S ASCM, which has impressive range, supersonic speed and terminal maneuvering. Undoubtedly, these weapons add very substantially to Vietnam’s defense capabilities. After all, Vietnam has long demonstrated an ability to wield ground forces effectively, but its abilities in the air, and particularly at sea have been quite limited, at least up to the present.
Moreover, naval analysts have long considered that China is particularly weak in antisubmarine warfare. Thus, it can perhaps be said that Hanoi has found a weakness in the Chinese armor that it is seeking to exploit. However, it should be said that the Chinese Navy has been aware of this weakness now for some years and is engaged in a broad front effort to try to improve its antisubmarine warfare capabilities by deploying, for example, new and capable light frigates in large numbers for the last two years.
As noted above, there are major concerns with respect to both training and maintenance related to the submarine purchase. It is perhaps true that modern fire control systems may allow relatively inexperienced crews to achieve certain combat results. But there should be no doubt that submarine forces are among the most complex of any military forces to operate, so that building a truly reliable and proficient force is likely to take not years, but decades.
Q.
If there was a military conflict between China and Vietnam today, who would prevail?
A.
China would likely prevail in almost any conceivable scenario. Vietnam has made some wise investments as described above and could almost certainly inflict losses against the Chinese Navy and Air Force. Yet China has been engaged in a process of intense military modernization now for two decades and is reaping the dividends. In preparing for various conflict scenarios that potentially involve the United States and/or Japan, China has built forces that are well equipped and highly trained. In the critical areas of submarines, surface combatants and fast attack craft, China also may count on a very considerable numerical advantage that would likely allow China to prevail despite taking losses.
To be sure, there are some dimensions of a military contest that could play in Hanoi’s favor. For example, China is not particularly strong in the domain of aerial refueling, so that Vietnam could potentially contest for air superiority, particularly in the areas of the South China Sea more distant from Chinese airfields. In a desperate situation, moreover, Hanoi may even consider escalating a clash at sea into a larger land border conflict, since its land forces might be more equally matched against Chinese land forces. However, this would be a risky gambit, particularly since Hanoi is relatively close to the Chinese border. Moreover, China also has certain capabilities it could employ to escalate. For example, China could make crippling air and missile strikes against Vietnamese naval and air bases.
In general, it should be said that forecasting military outcomes is notoriously difficult and the world has not witnessed a genuine modern naval war since the 1982 conflict in the Falklands. Therefore, the above short analysis needs to be treated with due caution.
Q.
The next ambassador to Vietnam, Ted Osius, is awaiting confirmation in the Senate. He said at his hearing that now may be the time for the U.S. to lift the arms embargo. Is the “may be” very polite, and in fact is the Pentagon ready to sell to Vietnam? What do you think the U.S. should sell to Vietnam, if the embargo is lifted?
A.
In my opinion, the U.S. should be cautious about selling weapons to Vietnam. While such sales could have some minor and symbolic deterrent value, such benefits could quite easily be outweighed by the potential to further escalate tensions between China and Vietnam. In the same way that Americans would react extremely negatively to Chinese arms sales in Latin America, for example to Cuba or Venezuela, so these sales would be understood in Beijing as part of an attempt by Washington to further “contain China.” As such, they would not only likely further inflame Vietnam-China tensions, but could be quite detrimental to U.S.-China relations, which are already rather strained.
Whereas with alliance partners, such as Japan or the Philippines, the U.S. has long-running defense agreements that have involved arms purchases and joint training exercises that go back over decades, such relationships with Vietnam would be starting from scratch. It is possible that certain platforms, such as maritime surveillance, could potentially be quite useful to the Vietnam armed forces. However, Hanoi would then face the difficult challenge of trying to integrate American systems together with the already substantial arsenal that it has purchased from Russia. That could present a major technical challenge.
Q.
Secretary of State John Kerry announced $18 million for Vietnam in maritime security last December. What will that be used for?
A.
It remains somewhat unclear, but available information suggests that these funds may be employed to purchase light patrol vessels of the type that have been contesting China in the “Paracels crisis” since May. It is noteworthy that Vietnam has been engaged in an aggressive building program to try to match China’s extensive coast guard forces, so these funds may assist in that effort. Japan also seems to be playing a role in this effort to upgrade Vietnam’s coast guard forces.
Such funds may be used to upgrade weaker elements in Vietnam’s equipment, for example with respect to radars or communications equipment. However, these small sums may be seen to be rather symbolic in nature. For example, a single prototype of the current U.S. Coast Guard medium-sized cutter (e.g., Sentinel-class) of 141 feet may cost in excess of $80 million per vessel, so this amount of aid will hardly be decisive in the maritime contest between Hanoi and Beijing.
Q.
How do you think in the coming few years Vietnam will manage China, its age-old foe and sometime friend?
A.
Vietnam and China have relations across a very wide spectrum of issues, as might be expected among large neighbors. The economic and sociocultural advantages of deeper integration among the two states are amply evident. Indeed, the intensity of these interactions, whether at a cultural level or among senior party cadres, has likely been underreported in the West. Nevertheless, it is amply clear that there remains an inclination for brinkmanship in both Hanoi and Beijing on some of the most sensitive issues, regrettably.
The potential for this fraught diplomacy to spiral out of control was powerfully demonstrated to both sides during the May riots in Vietnam. These riots have hurt both sides and will hopefully serve to remind leaders in both countries of the imperative to reach compromises on the sensitive issues that divide them in the South China Sea. In that regard, Washington needs to guard its own broader interests, which are invariably more closely tied to a stable U.S.-China relationship overall. In its dealings with Hanoi, Washington must avoid the trap of “bad friend syndrome,” in which it inadvertently goads Hanoi into an ever more intense confrontation with Beijing that Hanoi cannot hope to win. Indeed, Hanoi would do well to consider the recent fate of Ukraine in somewhat analogous circumstances.
Rather than preparing for armed conflict, Vietnam needs to employ energetic diplomacy to find its own modus vivendi with the emerging superpower to the north. This will be a difficult and dangerous process, to be sure, but will best ensure Vietnam’s prosperity and security for the long term in a tough neighborhood.
Prof. Lyle J. Goldstein, associate professor at the China Maritime Studies Institute at the Naval War College in Rhode Island, is well qualified to examine the capacities of the Chinese and Vietnamese militaries. The two armies worked together in Vietnam to topple the French in the 1950s, and to defeat the Americans in the Vietnam War. In 1979, the Chinese invaded Vietnam — to teach its neighbor a lesson for invading Cambodia, said Deng Xiaoping — and the Chinese retreated with stunning casualties in less than a month. That humbling experience was an impetus for the Chinese to begin the modernization of their armed forces.
Professor Goldstein, who is fluent in Chinese and Russian, has an M.A. in strategic studies from Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. During his PhD studies at Princeton he specialized in Chinese and spent time at Beijing City College. He joined the Naval War College in 2001 and helped establish the China Maritime Studies Institute in 2006, serving as its first director until 2011. The institute was founded specifically to conduct research for the United States Navy on China’s rapidly expanding navy. In 2012, Professor Goldstein, an avid reader of China’s military periodicals, worked on a project called “Research on Chinese Military Assessments of Selected East Asian Regional Powers.” He found that the Chinese had a certain disdain for the Vietnamese Navy but considerable respect for its air force.
Q.
Vietnam seems to want to strike a path that maintains a degree of independence from China, and from the United States. How does that play out in the military sphere?
A.
Vietnam is a country with a strong military tradition. Undoubtedly, Hanoi’s contemporary diplomacy and military strategy are strongly influenced by Vietnam’s modern history as a “giant killer.” The Vietnamese succeeded in ejecting the French colonizers during the 1950s, then defeating the Americans (1965-73) and finally in standing up to China in a short but bloody border war (1979). This history seems to have imbued Vietnam with a confidence to develop a rather independent approach to foreign policy. It likely has also encouraged Vietnam to invest heavily in defense — turning chiefly to its traditional partner Russia in that endeavor. Unlike certain other countries in Southeast Asia (e.g., the Philippines), Vietnam is not inclined to neglect defense. On the other hand, Vietnam’s most promising strategy versus China is the hope that it might have sufficient forces for deterrence, while simultaneously pursuing diplomacy to resolve disputes.
Q.
You have done some research on how the Chinese view Vietnam and its military. Do the Chinese have respect for the Vietnamese military? Do they harbor bad memories of the 1979 war against Vietnam? What does China, now so much more powerful, think now of Vietnam’s defense capacity?
A.
The Chinese have monitored Vietnam’s growing defense capacity extremely closely. Interestingly, both Beijing and Hanoi have relied to some extent on Russian arms — submarines, destroyers and frigates, as well as aircraft — to accelerate their defense modernization efforts. This common experience more than likely informs China’s overall assessment of Vietnam’s military abilities. There is some irony in the fact that the very same weapons and tactics that China might hypothetically deploy against Japan or the U.S. in any possible armed conflict could also be deployed by Vietnam against China.
On the other hand, China also understands that importing weaponry from Russia is not necessarily an ideal situation, because it may inevitably lead to serious and even endemic training and maintenance lapses. The recent major submarine accident in India, involving a Kilo-class diesel submarine imported from Russia, well illustrates the risks involved. At this point, Vietnam is much more dependent on weapons and military expertise from Russia than is China, which can rely on much more indigenous military capacity.
While the 1979 war is not a major topic of open discussion and research in China, there does seem to be ample respect in China for Vietnam’s overall fighting prowess. Nevertheless, Chinese military researchers have pointed out various weaknesses in Vietnam’s evolving military strategy. Specifically, it has been noted that submarines may be a major thrust of Vietnam’s efforts, but Chinese analysts assess that Vietnam is fundamentally lacking in major experience in operating these incredibly complex weapons systems. Another possible weakness in Vietnam’s defense capability identified by Chinese analysts concerns surveillance, targeting and battle management. There seems to be a general sense that China could prevail in any armed clash, following what is referred to in Chinese military circles as the “3.14 model,” which refers to the 14 March 1988 clash in the Spratlys in which a small Chinese naval flotilla sank a couple of Vietnamese ships in a small but decisive engagement.
Q.
Vietnam has bought six Kilo-class submarines from the Russians. Why did they choose those subs? Will the Vietnamese have crew well enough trained to run the subs? Are the subs well suited to Vietnam’s needs?
A.
Many naval analysts contend that the submarine is the capital ship of any modern navy. While surface ships have become increasingly vulnerable to long-range detection and precision strike, submarines remain quite survivable because of the inherent difficulties of hunting submarines. They can operate quite independently, but still deliver lethal blows with either torpedoes or antiship cruise missiles (ASCM).
The Kilo-class Russian diesel submarine has been a popular export around the world, including to the navies of both India and China. The submarine is respected as a formidable opponent in U.S. Navy circles, not only because it is rated to have a low acoustic signature, making detection extremely difficult, but also because of the effectiveness of its associated weapons systems, for example the Klub-S ASCM, which has impressive range, supersonic speed and terminal maneuvering. Undoubtedly, these weapons add very substantially to Vietnam’s defense capabilities. After all, Vietnam has long demonstrated an ability to wield ground forces effectively, but its abilities in the air, and particularly at sea have been quite limited, at least up to the present.
Moreover, naval analysts have long considered that China is particularly weak in antisubmarine warfare. Thus, it can perhaps be said that Hanoi has found a weakness in the Chinese armor that it is seeking to exploit. However, it should be said that the Chinese Navy has been aware of this weakness now for some years and is engaged in a broad front effort to try to improve its antisubmarine warfare capabilities by deploying, for example, new and capable light frigates in large numbers for the last two years.
As noted above, there are major concerns with respect to both training and maintenance related to the submarine purchase. It is perhaps true that modern fire control systems may allow relatively inexperienced crews to achieve certain combat results. But there should be no doubt that submarine forces are among the most complex of any military forces to operate, so that building a truly reliable and proficient force is likely to take not years, but decades.
Q.
If there was a military conflict between China and Vietnam today, who would prevail?
A.
China would likely prevail in almost any conceivable scenario. Vietnam has made some wise investments as described above and could almost certainly inflict losses against the Chinese Navy and Air Force. Yet China has been engaged in a process of intense military modernization now for two decades and is reaping the dividends. In preparing for various conflict scenarios that potentially involve the United States and/or Japan, China has built forces that are well equipped and highly trained. In the critical areas of submarines, surface combatants and fast attack craft, China also may count on a very considerable numerical advantage that would likely allow China to prevail despite taking losses.
To be sure, there are some dimensions of a military contest that could play in Hanoi’s favor. For example, China is not particularly strong in the domain of aerial refueling, so that Vietnam could potentially contest for air superiority, particularly in the areas of the South China Sea more distant from Chinese airfields. In a desperate situation, moreover, Hanoi may even consider escalating a clash at sea into a larger land border conflict, since its land forces might be more equally matched against Chinese land forces. However, this would be a risky gambit, particularly since Hanoi is relatively close to the Chinese border. Moreover, China also has certain capabilities it could employ to escalate. For example, China could make crippling air and missile strikes against Vietnamese naval and air bases.
In general, it should be said that forecasting military outcomes is notoriously difficult and the world has not witnessed a genuine modern naval war since the 1982 conflict in the Falklands. Therefore, the above short analysis needs to be treated with due caution.
Q.
The next ambassador to Vietnam, Ted Osius, is awaiting confirmation in the Senate. He said at his hearing that now may be the time for the U.S. to lift the arms embargo. Is the “may be” very polite, and in fact is the Pentagon ready to sell to Vietnam? What do you think the U.S. should sell to Vietnam, if the embargo is lifted?
A.
In my opinion, the U.S. should be cautious about selling weapons to Vietnam. While such sales could have some minor and symbolic deterrent value, such benefits could quite easily be outweighed by the potential to further escalate tensions between China and Vietnam. In the same way that Americans would react extremely negatively to Chinese arms sales in Latin America, for example to Cuba or Venezuela, so these sales would be understood in Beijing as part of an attempt by Washington to further “contain China.” As such, they would not only likely further inflame Vietnam-China tensions, but could be quite detrimental to U.S.-China relations, which are already rather strained.
Whereas with alliance partners, such as Japan or the Philippines, the U.S. has long-running defense agreements that have involved arms purchases and joint training exercises that go back over decades, such relationships with Vietnam would be starting from scratch. It is possible that certain platforms, such as maritime surveillance, could potentially be quite useful to the Vietnam armed forces. However, Hanoi would then face the difficult challenge of trying to integrate American systems together with the already substantial arsenal that it has purchased from Russia. That could present a major technical challenge.
Q.
Secretary of State John Kerry announced $18 million for Vietnam in maritime security last December. What will that be used for?
A.
It remains somewhat unclear, but available information suggests that these funds may be employed to purchase light patrol vessels of the type that have been contesting China in the “Paracels crisis” since May. It is noteworthy that Vietnam has been engaged in an aggressive building program to try to match China’s extensive coast guard forces, so these funds may assist in that effort. Japan also seems to be playing a role in this effort to upgrade Vietnam’s coast guard forces.
Such funds may be used to upgrade weaker elements in Vietnam’s equipment, for example with respect to radars or communications equipment. However, these small sums may be seen to be rather symbolic in nature. For example, a single prototype of the current U.S. Coast Guard medium-sized cutter (e.g., Sentinel-class) of 141 feet may cost in excess of $80 million per vessel, so this amount of aid will hardly be decisive in the maritime contest between Hanoi and Beijing.
Q.
How do you think in the coming few years Vietnam will manage China, its age-old foe and sometime friend?
A.
Vietnam and China have relations across a very wide spectrum of issues, as might be expected among large neighbors. The economic and sociocultural advantages of deeper integration among the two states are amply evident. Indeed, the intensity of these interactions, whether at a cultural level or among senior party cadres, has likely been underreported in the West. Nevertheless, it is amply clear that there remains an inclination for brinkmanship in both Hanoi and Beijing on some of the most sensitive issues, regrettably.
The potential for this fraught diplomacy to spiral out of control was powerfully demonstrated to both sides during the May riots in Vietnam. These riots have hurt both sides and will hopefully serve to remind leaders in both countries of the imperative to reach compromises on the sensitive issues that divide them in the South China Sea. In that regard, Washington needs to guard its own broader interests, which are invariably more closely tied to a stable U.S.-China relationship overall. In its dealings with Hanoi, Washington must avoid the trap of “bad friend syndrome,” in which it inadvertently goads Hanoi into an ever more intense confrontation with Beijing that Hanoi cannot hope to win. Indeed, Hanoi would do well to consider the recent fate of Ukraine in somewhat analogous circumstances.
Rather than preparing for armed conflict, Vietnam needs to employ energetic diplomacy to find its own modus vivendi with the emerging superpower to the north. This will be a difficult and dangerous process, to be sure, but will best ensure Vietnam’s prosperity and security for the long term in a tough neighborhood.
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